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ESSAY
LIBEL, THE "HIGHER TRUTHS" OF ART,
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
IsMoRE SImR t
During the 1960's, both the lay and professional publics became
aware of the possibility that common law libel concepts could clash
with-and run afoul of-the first amendment. Although New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan' for the first time in our national history
subjected state tort law to a searching constitutional critique, it was
not in reality so revolutionary a decision as most commentators have
maintained.2 The creation of a so-called "constitutional privilege"
negligently to misstate defamatory facts on matters of public interest
about public officials, first enunciated in Sullivan and further de-
veloped in its progeny, was based upon certain sound (though not
universally accepted) common law concepts. Sullivan only cast in
constitutional terms an ongoing judicial attempt to balance the
rights of free speech and press against the individual's interest in
reputation.3 "Fair comment" doctrine, along with the minority
view granting a privilege to libelous utterances made in good faith,
without malice, and about public affairs, were raised to the level of
constitutional imperative. In the 1960's, courts sought to encourage
an "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" atmosphere of public
debate, so that now "[t]he law of defamation has in effect been
rewritten . . . . ,4 The emergence of new literary and scholarly
forms of expression in the 1970's has sown seeds that promise to
ripen into yet another re-evaluation of common law libel concepts
in a contemporary setting.
f Professor of Constitutional Law and History, John Jay College of Criminal
Justice, City University of New York. B.S. 1955, University of Wisconsin; J.D. 1959,
M.A. 1965, New York University. Member, New York and Massachusetts Bars.
'376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2P. KuBLAND, PoLmcs, THE CONsTIrON, AND TmE WABIEN COURT 64
(1970). See Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REv. 1349, 1360-66
(1975).
3 "[T]he weapon adopted by the Court [in Sullivan] was one already proto-
typed in the common law." Eaton, supra note 2, at 1366.
4 Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 888 (2d Cir. 1976).
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I. THE NEw LrrEiUTuRE
New forms of artistic, literary, and scholarly expression are to
be found in all of the media, especially print and visual. In modem
literature, our post-Freudian sensibility has attempted to grapple
with the great problems of human existence and meaning by openly
and frankly proclaiming that there are no boundaries between the
private psyche and the public act.5 The quest for "higher truths"
is a broad-based one that unabashedly subjects the lives of charac-
ters-both fictional and real-to incisive, at times scathing, analysis.
Creative artists have used psychological insights and techniques to
depict not only a fictional world, but to interpret a frequently
bewildering reality. Indeed, to many serious artists, the bizarre
nature of reality seems to be more interesting, more stimulating, and
more worthy of exploration than any self-constructed fantasies.6
This development in the creative arts has had two offshoots: the
cultivation of serious scholarly interest in psycho-biography and
psycho-history,7 and an inevitable descent into popular culture.8
5 The modem literary sensibility betrays a "bitter impatience with the whole
apparatus of cognition and the limiting assumption of rationality" and derives in
part from "Freud, who focuses upon the irremediable conflict between nature and
culture" and "the damage done the life of instinct." Tim IDEA OF THm MoDmwr IN
LrrmTnE AND THE ARTS 16, 23 (L Howe ed. 1967). "The traditional values of
decorum, both in the general ethical sense and strictly literary sense, are overturned.
Everything must now be explored to its outer and inner limits; but more, there are
to be no limits . . . ," id. 31, so that "[c]haracter ... is regarded not as a coherent,
definable, and well-structured entity, but as a psychic battlefield, or an insoluble
puzzle ...... Id. 34. "As there had been a movement dedicated to recording
the realities of the outer world in the 19th century, so it was necessary to recognize
the 20th century's search for inner reality." L. EDEL, THE MODERN PSYCHOLoIcAL
NovWrL v-vi (1964). These novelists had an "acute need to cope with inner prob-
lems and project ... inner life before the world." Id. 12. "Freud had presented
a paranoid version of the relation of the self to culture: he conceived of the self
submitting to culture and being yet in opposition to it .... [11n respect of this
'paranoia' Freud is quite at one with literature." L. TRILLINc, Freud: Within and
Beyond Culture, in BEYOND CULTURE 117-18 (1965). For a general analysis of
both the serious and popular literary reception to Freud in America, see F.J.
HoFsmAN, FnEtrAN,rsm ANa TE LnmrnY MIND (2d ed. 1957).
6 P. RoTra, Writing American Fiction, in READINa MYSELF AND OTHERS 117-47
(1975).
7 Recent examples of psycho-history by America's leading practitioner of the
mode are B. MAzLrars, Kssmzas, THE ExroPEAx MIND rn AMEmmcA PoLicy
(1976); B. MAZrsLI5, IN SEARCH OF NIXON (1972). See also B. Brodie, A Psycho-
analytic Interpretation of Woodrow Wilson, in PsYcHoANALYsrs AND HIsTory 118-19
(B. Mazlish ed. 1963) (Wilson's political failures attributed to his "compulsive and
obsessive behavior" resulting from "serious loss of self-esteem which his father was
inflicting on him"). Erikson's notable contributions to the field include E. ERIXsON,
GANDHI's TnuTH (1969); E. ERIKsoN, YOUNG MAN LUTHER (1962). Luther has
been of particular interest to psycho-historians. See N.O. BROwN, Lw- AGAINST
DEATH 202 (1959). Both Brown and Erikson identify Luther's anal-compulsive
personality with the genesis of his religious revelation.
8 Mario Puzo's best-seller The Godfather contained a character-a singer named
Johnny Fontane-whose psyche was extensively probed. The resemblances between
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In response to the first, new academic fields have grown; in response
to the second, television has begun to explore the world, not by
pallid documentary alone, but also by the creation of dramatic fic-
tionalized productions. In the last three years, we have seen
hypothesized dramas of the trial of Lee Harvey Oswald, and of four
days in the lives of Oswald and Jack Ruby immediately preceding
the assassination of former President Kennedy. The life of Martin
Luther King has been the subject of a fictionalized documentary,
and one "mini-series" explored the Watergate-like activities of a
thinly-veiled President Richard Monckton. One may choose to
distinguish psychological speculation about undisguised historical
persons from the superficially fictional dramatization,9 yet surely
both manifest the same modem impulse to expose the private mind
to public scrutiny. There can be no question that public interest
in such speculations and dramatizations will continue. There is
also no question that much of this modem culture, popular and
serious, runs headlong into the most fundamental tenets of libel law.
This Essay considers the collision between one particular art
form-the novel of "faction" 10-and libel, yet its general perspective
is applicable to most of the formats mentioned above. I have
chosen the novel of faction-indeed, one particular novel, The Public
Burning, by Robert Coover-because it constitutes the best example
I know of the myriad problems presented; it is also a clear portent
of the future direction the creative novel in our time is likely to
take. The book is an all-encompassing rendition of the 1950s
trauma in American political and moral life. It centers on the
the fictional Fontane and the real life Frank Sinatra were barely disguLsed. judy
Garland was the (not very well concealed) subject matter of another best seller,
Valley of the Dolls. Both Godfather and Valley became motion pictures. The
world-renowned motion picture "Citizen Kane" was the unconcealed rendition of
the life of William Randolph Hearst, and resulted in an "attempt to keep [it] off
the screen by threats of boycott and of libel litigation." Tdesman, Democracy and
Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Comment II, 42 CoLum. L. REv. 1282, 1317 &
n.141 (1942). For F. Scott Fitzgerald's use of "real" persons in his classic novel
The Great Gatsby, see H.D. Pirpn, TmE GAT GATSBY: THE NOVEL, THE CRITICs,
BACxcROUND 171-97 (1970).
9 See text following note 53 infra.
10 Unlike other literary forms, the novel generally is a device uniquely useful
for representing fact and fiction as a single mode of experience. See R. ScHOLrS
& R. KELLOGG, THE NATuBE oF NABmAT- 58 (1966). One might describe the novel
of "faction" as one that adheres fairly closely to historical fact as a foundation for
psychological speculation about-or "mythologizing" of-the real persons and events
it describes. This description accommodates not only The Public Burning, but also
the book that may have spawned the term: Alex Haley's Roots. See L. Morrow,
Licing With the "Peculiar Institution", Tmm, Feb. 14, 1977, at 76.
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famous case of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. "Richard Nixon" and
another, unnamed, narrator tell Coover's story in alternating chap-
ters. Much of the novel is factual, and recites bits of courtroom
testimony, political speeches, and some writings of the time; much is
a phantasmagoria that reaches a sexual and dramatic climax-when
Julius and Ethel Rosenberg are electrocuted in Times Square. The
electrocution is accompanied by a ritualistic and orgiastic display
of both hatred for the victims and mindless reaffirmation of the
American Dream. Famous political personages and other celebrities
(along with, for instance, Sing Sing prison's little-known executioner)
are portrayed as willing participants in the national exorcism of
symbolic devils. Certain political figures-former Attorney General
Herbert Brownell, Assistant Prosecutor Roy Cohn, and, of course,
Judge Irving Kaufman-are depicted with greater specificity: they
utilize (or at least know of or suspect) unethical means and tactics
to convict and ensure the execution of the somewhat flawed martyrs.
"Nixon's" stream of consciousness reveals that he is the victim
of personal insecurities and traumas, and of social and political
forces beyond his comprehension. He is sympathetically depicted in
part, but becomes accidentally involved in two major ludicrous and
embarrassing (and probably libelous) situations: a bungled would-be
seduction of the imprisoned Ethel Rosenberg, and his own victimi-
zation via a public act of sodomy committed by a mythical Uncle
Sam.
Were the work solely "fantasy," the issues might be clearer.
Unfortunately, the novel of faction derives its thrust from the liberal
admixture of fact and fantasy. The reader cannot readily dis-
tinguish between the two, and even clearly symbolic events may be
threaded with historical fact. While a bestseller such as E. L.
Doctorow's Ragtime portrays deceased public figures, Coover's tome
depicts many individuals still living; while Philip Roth's Our Gang
and some television fictionalizations erect a flimsy curtain of changed
names, Coover explodes his bombshells upon the heads of real
people. The issues posed by his honesty (or is it innocence?) are not
ephemeral; given the general state of American libel law they are
not easy ones, either. The law has simply not yet decreed the
immunity for libel defendants against all claims by public figures
for which Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg once argued.1'
Although some commentators have found Gertz v. Robert Welch,
11 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 296 (1964) (Black, J.,
concurring, joined by Douglas, J.); id. 298 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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Inc.12 virtually to have abrogated the law of libel,'3 Gertz only
decided that damages can no longer be presumed in a libel suit
premised on less than the Sullivan standard of liability for "malice."
As recent cases demonstrate, even public figures may still prevail. 14
It is clear that, on principles enunciated in Sullivan and eluci-
dated in its progeny, creative works of fiction (and speculative works
of scholarship) could be protected when clearly understood as such.15
In essence, psychological character probing is an educated guess
about human motivation-an opinion. While such speculation is
commonplace in the scholarly literature of psycho-history and
psycho-biography, it also exists in the novel of faction. A novel can
either depict a fictional character, or attempt to reveal the deeper
personality of an extant and real one."6 The invented action of a
novel is nothing more than the author's opinion of what a character
would do under certain circumstances. So long as the reader is
warned that the matter is one of opinion, traditional defenses such
as "fair comment" should be available regardless of the particular
genre.' 7 While the Court has found no constitutional protection
for the "calculated falsehood," "I the cases have involved purported
factual truth. In the cases where liability has been found for novel-
ized depictions of otherwise real people, the gravamen of the wrong
is the ill-concealed attempt to evade the laws of libel by "passing off"
truth in an alleged fiction.19 The novel of faction, as well as the
other literary and scholarly forms mentioned, use truth to arrive
at what is clear fiction: the author's opinion-the author's "higher
truth." The Public Burning makes the matter clear by creating a
pure and unabashed fantasy that lends an aura of unreality to even
the seemingly literal facts presented.
12418 U.S. 323 (1974). Cf. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 460-61
(1976) (approving damages for personal humiliation and mental anguish at suit of
non-public figure).
13 See, e.g., Eaton, supra note 2, at 1414.
14 E.g., Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976).
15 "Is there any basis for any inference on the part of rational readers or viewers
that the antics engaging their attention are anything more than fiction . . . ?"
University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 22 App.
Div. 2d 452, 455, 256 N.Y.S.2d 301, 304, aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 940, 207 N.E.2d 508
(1965).
16 "[T]his has been the century of psychology; and the novel, as we know, has
always been first and foremost 'psychological."' L. EDEL, supra note 5, at 203.
'7 "[Clriticism in the art world may be based on such intangibles as experience,
taste, and feeling." Fisher v. Washington Post Co., 212 A.2d 335, 338 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1965).
18 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
'9 See notes 104 and 105 infra.
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Works such as Coover's valuable exploration of the national
psyche of the 1950's deserve more than the uncertain protection now
afforded by our libel law. The balance of this Essay suggests that
various presently-debated extensions of the first amendment, if
applied to libel, could provide such immunity, yet the likelihood
that such quantum leaps in legal theory will occur is small. The
more fruitful approach I advocate is to cultivate, within the ambit
of presently accepted doctrine, a greater sensibility of the role of
the new psychological literature in our culture, and an understand-
ing that such literature falls within traditionally accepted immuni-
ties from the libel action.
II. ADAPTING LIBEL LAW TO THE NEW LITERATURE
To understand fully how fiction can reveal "higher truth"
deserving of constitutional protection, it is necessary briefly to men-
tion the evolution of libel law and its increased sensitivity toward
the right of free speech-and, certainly, artistic expression is a form
of free speech.20 Libel law has traditionally been a law of accretion;
doctrines have been piled upon doctrines to create a sort of legal
phantasmagoria. 21 Since Sullivan can be viewed as both the cul-
mination of a process of common law adjudication as well as the
onset of a constitutional revolution, it is necessary to take a step
backward fully to realize that landmark advances in libel law have
occurred (a) by accretion and (b) in political contexts.
The first line of development, at least in American law, is
grounded not in the realm of substantive change, but in the cognate
one of procedure. Early in our history, the jury was given the
authority to determine whether a particular utterance was libelous. 22
The Zenger case was, of course, an anomaly for the early eighteenth
century, and remained something of an isolated and lonely landmark
for about a century. It is significant that the case involved the
criminal prosecution of a critic of a governor of New York, and
that it was but part of an ongoing political struggle. More than
mere procedure was, of course, involved, for the history of liberty
20 A poster is "a form of public interest presentation .... That the format
may deviate from traditional patterns of political commentary, or that to some it
may appear more entertaining than informing, would not alter its [constitutionally]
protected status." Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 450, 299
N.Y.S.2d 501, 507-08 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1968).
21 See Eaton, supra note 2, at 1349-63; Smith, Jones v. Hulton: Three Con-
flicting Judicial Views as to a Question of Defamation, 60 U. PA. L. REy. 365,
365-70 (1912).
22 See A BEsuF NArauTrvE OF THE CASE Aim TrAL OF Jown PETEm ZENqGE
(S.N. Katz ed. 1963); L.W. LEvY, LEGACY oF SuPPRESsiON 19 (1960).
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has been largely a history of procedural victory for what we would
now call due process of law.
23
While in England it may have been true that the maxim "the
greater the truth, the greater the libel" prevailed in theory, early
in our history-and again in the realm of political libel-a major
substantive doctrine emerged: nothing less than the revolutionary
concept of the defense of truth.24 Even the detested Sedition Act of
1798-a blatantly partisan measure designed to punish a political
party for its attempt to unseat the majority party-contained a
provision recognizing the defense.25 Of course, defamatory "opin-
ions" were another matter: the law of libel still proscribed them,
although they were not, and usually could not be, demonstrably
true or false.
28
The third line of defense, articulated as a matter of constitu-
tional principle in Sullivan (though not without common law
precedent),27 is limited protection of factual misrepresentations.
Sullivan recognized that modern news gathering and dissemination
techniques often lead to inadvertent or even negligent untruth, and
that the defamed individual's interest in his reputation had to be
measured "against the background of a profound national commit-
ment to the principle that debate on public issues should be unin-
23 "The history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of pro-
cedural safeguards." McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943) (Frank-
furter, J.). This "safeguard" was not always evident in seditious libel cases before
the American Revolution: "But juries, with the power of ruling on the guilt or
innocence of alleged libels, proved to be as susceptible to prevailing prejudices as
judges when they decided the fate of defendants who had expressed unpopular
sentiments .... They could be relied upon to support freedom of speech-and-
press, as in the Zenger case, only if public opinion opposed the administration."
L.W. L v, supra note 22, at 131-32.
24 Truth as a defense was late in coming. L.W. LEvy, supra note 22, at 133
(discussing People v. Crosvell, 3 Johns. Cas. 336, 363-94 (N.Y. 1804). Professor
Levy believes that only in the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 did truth emerge
as an acknowledged defense. Id. 202-03.
"The only reason why the law makes truth a defense is not because a libel
must be false, but because the utterance of truth is in all circumstances an interest
paramount to reputation .... " Burton v. Crowell Pub. Co., 82 F.2d 154, 156
(2d Cir. 1936). Despite this, the court found liability where the "truth" of the
matter could not be proved one way or the other-for the photograph held to be
libelous was a "true" but obvious optical illusion and distortion that severely
embarrassed plaintiff. See text accompanying notes 65-70 infra.
25 Sedition Act of 1798, ch. lxxiv, § 3, 1 Stat 596 (1798) (expired 1801),
reprinted in J. Szrr, FnnxoM's FEIrxs 441-42 (1956).
26 There are "many truths, important to society, which are not susceptible of
that full, direct, and positive evidence, which alone can be exhibited before a court
and jury." G. HAY, AN EssAY ox THE LmavRT or =l Prxss 26-27 (1799),
quoted in L.W. LEVY, supra note 22, at 272.
27 Minnesota and nine other states had a "Sullivan privilege" under their fair
comment doctrines prior to 1964. Mahnke v. Northwest Pubs., Inc., 280 Minn.
328, 160 N.W.2d 1, 7 (1968).
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hibited, robust, and wide open ... ." 28 Sullivan and its progeny
engendered considerable judicial re-evaluation of some traditional
problems (opinion and fair comment among them) in light of this
"national commitment"; sometimes the re-evaluation occurred in
non-constitutional terms.
A fourth line of defense again implicates procedure. Since
Sullivan, defendants in libel cases have been encouraged to wield
the weapon of summary judgment, in appropriate circumstances, to
ensure that costs of libel suits, which are often intimidating, are
minimized.2 9 Thus, the judiciary, without much guidance from
the Supreme Court, has sought to effectuate the theoretical protec-
tions offered by Sullivan. Problems of permissible amounts and
types of damages, even to the successful plaintiff, are increasingly
occupying judicial time, and limitations of as yet uncertain efficacy
upon "presumed" and "punitive" damages have been imposed.30
The complexities of libel law, already most bewildering, have
markedly increased as a result of Sullivan; courts must grapple
more sophisticatedly than they have in the past with the paradox of
liberalized access to law for protection of reputation and a con-
comitant reluctance to defeat the public's right to know.31 Adding
to the complexity is the realization that the conception of what is
libelous varies from time to time and from community to com-
munity, so that the judiciary must attempt to understand the state
of public opinion at a given moment in history. Also, libel law has
always mirrored shifts in changing political, as well as social, mores.32
28 376 U.S. at 270.
29 See Bon Air Motel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970);
Wasserman v. Time, Inc., 424 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Guitar v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 1042, 1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (summary judgment "the
rule, and not the exception" in defamation cases). But see Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448, 475 n.3 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
3 o While Firestone does not abrogate Gertz' holding that punitive damages can
only be found where Sullivan's standards have been met in all cases, can juries in
fact assess punitive damages in the guise of damages for mental anguish? It
appears that Eaton's conclusion that punitive damages will not be awarded "in all
but a handful of cases" is at least questionable. See Eaton, supra note 2, at 1439-40.
3 1 While Sullivan was premised upon a preference for the right to know over
common law libel, Firestone found a balance between the "public's interest in an
uninhibited press and its equally compelling need for judicial redress of libelous
utterances." 424 U.S. at 456.
32 "Even if these views [as to what is libelous] may soon be altered and are
in truth only the mores of the times, they must be respected as criteria. If it were
libelous per se in 1889 to write of a man as an anarchist . ..and libelous per se
in 1915 to write of a man as a socialist . .. it is libelous per se in 1945 to write
of a man as a Communist." Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F.2d 619, 622 (7th Cir. 1947).
By 1968, when much of anti-Communist hysteria had passed, it was not libelous
per se to write of a man that he followed a "party line" and "supports communist
objectives." McGaw v. Webster, 79 N.M. 104, 440 P.2d 296, 297-98 (1968). A
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Surely such complexity and rapid change in the law of libel exert
a chill on free expression generally. Yet the inhibiting effect of the
law's uncertainty will likely work its will most cruelly on the new
literature and scholarship that demands freedom to speculate, to
fantasize, to blithely (or savagely) intertwine the public and the
private, the political and the sexual. Whether an over-cautious
reading of the law or misperception of the art form be the cause,
those who counsel writers of the new literature will surely commend
restraint, and the result may be an unfortunate closing off of an
intriguing world of insight and speculation.
We have seen libel law to be a creature of case law accretion
and occasional doctrinal revision. Perhaps some such "leap for-
ward" will come to the aid of the new literature.
The judiciary could find that all discussion of public political
issues is absolutely privileged against libel claims, irrespective of
the medium of discussion involved and irrespective of the nature
of the discussion. This would entail adoption of the so-called
Meiklejohn theory of the first amendment.33 The theory logically
could be extended to permit speculation about the sex lives of
political figures, a step that even the most enthusiastic adherents of
untrammeled public discussion might not be prepared to take.3
In addition, such a sharp division between political and other public
issues would run completely counter to those first amendment de-
velopments that seek to protect the public's right to know about
matters of general, presumably non-political, interest.s
charge of "leftism" leveled against the chairman of a grape boycott movement was
sufficient to preclude summary judgment against plaintiff where the court was not
sure whether plaintiff and family were public figures, and whether, under Gertz,
defendant was negligent. Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56 Haw. 522,
543 P.2d 1356 (1975). In 1967, in Minnesota, it was still libelous to call a promi-
nent sociology professor a "Communist front member" who "collaborate[d] with a
Communist and communist fronters." Rose v. Koch, 278 Minn. 235, 154 N.W.2d
409, 415, 416 (1967) (case remanded to correct erroneous Sullivan instruction).
See also Riesman, supra note 8, at 1282, 1284 (1942) (regional differences
may lead to abuse of libel law as weapon to silence political advocacy by "out-
siders").
33 A. MEuaEJOHN, PoLrcAL FrlEom (1960); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPFecH
AND ITS lhnLAroN To SEFx GovmwmNTr (1948); Meiklejohn, The First Amend-
ment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245.
34 "Purely private defamation has little to do with the political ends of a self-
governing society" and "private conduct of a public official or private citizen"
should still be subject to traditional rules. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 301 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
35 E.g., Winters v. Nev York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (first amendment extends
to sensationalist magazines); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952)
(motion pictures as art form protected by first amendment); Molony v. Boy Comics
Pubs., Inc., 277 App. Div. 166, 98 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1950) (comic books are consti-
tutionally protected as modem example of ancient art form of picture writing).
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The application of Meiklejohn's approach to Coover's novel is
troubling, for it would protect artistic speech only because (and so
far as) it happens to be political speech. It might require winnow-
ing political from non-political discourse in a book that patently
tries to intertwine the two. Moreover, The Public Burning was
written and received as a novel, not as a political tract. If the
Meiklejohn theory would protect it only because of its fortuitous (if
undeniable) political import, one is left feeling that other-less
obviously political-works of psycho-history and psycho-biography are
left in jeopardy. In short, this theory is useful but inelegant for
present purposes; it protects works such as The Public Burning for
the wrong reason.
A second possible solution is to immunize the printed word as
such from libel claims when the work concerns matters of political-
perhaps even a more generalized public-interest. There is much
to be said for this approach, for, in today's society, the picture-
especially the televised picture-has a provably greater impact and a
greater capacity for "sting" than does the written word. Indeed,
many of the cases to be discussed in the remainder of this Essay,
especially the more recent ones, have involved the visual, rather
than the written medium (indeed, these cases have mirrored plain-
tiffs' greater concern for the consequences of visual rather than
written defamation where both media had presented the same
material).30 Of course, the courts have distinguished between the
two media, at least for certain constitutional purposes, and have
recognized the differing effects of film and print upon the public
consciousness.37 Adapting such distinctions to the law of libel could
lead to the result that The Public Burning would pass muster as
a novel, yet remain defamatory if produced as a motion picture or
television special. Such a solution, though desirable from the novel-
ist's point of view, is not likely to be adopted. The "sting" of the
written word, especially in the mass media, is still of great judicial
concern. There has been too little discussion of the relevance of the
medium in the realm of libel,38 although greater sensitivity has been
36 See cases cited in note 44 infra.
37 See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952).
38 Instead, current dispute centers upon such issues as what events and which
participants, as the subject matter of speech, entitle the speaker to Sullivan pro-
tection of negligent misstatement. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974). Gertz looked to voluntary participation by the individual claiming libel in
an event of "public controversy." Quaere: What is an event of public controversy?
How much general notoriety must a public figure command before he or she may
be deemed a public figure for all purposes? Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448
(1976), demonstrates that such questions are not apt to be easily or consistently
answered.
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shown in other areas of law.39 There is still an overweening pre-
occupation with the protection of so called "private" conduct, at
least in the law of libel.4 0
A third approach is to afford immunity to novels and scholar-
ship as exceptional modes of expression within the print medium.
After all, the novel advertises itself as fiction-the product of one
artist's imagination-while the newer academic disciplines label
themselves speculation. Psycho-history would, in any event, be
protected as fair comment to the extent that it is based upon scrupu-
lous adherence to the facts.41 Wholesale immunization of particular
genres of speech is not likely to be adopted for much the same
reason that a new theory of freedom of the print medium from libel
is unexpected: courts have been too solicitous of the reputational
interests of private persons to assume that whole categories of ex-
pression deserve constitutional exception from libel liability.
No, it is more likely that increased judicial protection will
occur slowly, essentially through the further refinement of common
law defenses-defenses that are peculiarly relevant to the novel of
faction. These defenses involve extant rules concerning sufficient
"identification" of the person allegedly libeled, fair comment, and
burlesque and parody as exceptions to the "ridicule" wing of libel.
An understanding of the scope of these defenses, especially as they
have responded to changing times, will clarify the problems posed
by the novel of faction. If a constitutional decision-either wholly
insulating that format or not-is eventually rendered, it will depend
in large part upon a full understanding of these defenses.
39 One looks naturally to copyright law. See, e.g., Nimmer, Does Copyright
Abridge The First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press? 17 U.C.L.A.
L. BEv. 1180, 1197 (1970) (unique expressiveness of photograph provokes special
first amendment problems). One of the unsettled problems of copyright law is
whether parody and burlesque renditions of a copyrighted work are saved from
infringement by the fair use doctrine. Compare Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d
532, 537 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd by an equally divided court sub nom. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958), with Columbia
Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348, 352-54 (S.D. Cal.
1955). See Netterville, Copyright and Tort Aspects of Parody, Mimicry and
Humorous Commentary, 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 225 (1962); Note, Parody and Copy-
right Infringement, 56 COLum. L. Rlv. 585 (1956).
40 "[T]o extend the Times doctrine to include every aspect of a person's private
life is an unfavored extension .... ." Buckley v. Esquire, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 1133,
1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). "The publication in question related strictly to his public
character. It made no reference to his private life .... ." Time, Inc. v. Johnston,
448 F.2d 378, 380 (4th Cir. 1971) (article about one basketball player "destroying"
the career of another).
41A separate inquiry is how many facts need be available to raise a fair
comment defense for psychological speculation.
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III. PROTECTION FOR THE NEW LrrRATuRE UNDER EXISTING
TENETS OF LIBEL LAW
A. Fiction and Libel
Fiction as an art form enjoys no immunity from traditional
principles of libel. "Reputations may not be traduced with im-
punity [even] under the literary form of a work of fiction .... 42
Although there may be substantial difficulties in establishing that a
particular fictional defamation was "of and concerning" the plaintiff,
once that hurdle has been overcome, liability has followed. As one
court bluntly put it, the remedy for the creative writer "is to abstain
from defamatory words." 43 Of course, the traditional fiction case
has arisen in the context of the use of a fictionalized name in the
roman ti clef situation.44 Perhaps because so many of the leading
4 2 Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 65, 126 N.E. 260, 262 (1920).
43Id. at 64, 126 N.E. at 262 (citations omitted).
44 An extreme case of liability for use of a fictional name similar to, though not
identical with, plaintiff's occurred in Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58,
126 N.E. 260 (1920). A "sensational novel" depicting a character named
"Cornigan" as an "associate of low and depraved characters" was actionable even
though defendant "was unaware of . . . [plaintiff's] existence or that it was written
'of and concerning' any existing person." Id. at 62, 63, 126 N.E. at 262.
In Callahan v. Israels, 140 Misc. 295, 250 N.Y.S. 470 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1931),
plaintiff Neil Callahan, fictionalized as Ralph Halloran, had a good cause of action.
The classic case is Youssoupoff v. MGM Pictures, Ltd., 50 T.L.R. 581 (C.A. 1934),
wherein the "real" "princess Natasha," a former Russian noblewoman, won the
staggering sum of 9 25,000 based upon her depiction as either a rape or seduction
victim of the notorious Rasputin prior to the Russian Revolution. Lord Justice
Scrutton, in a seriatim opinion, held that a depiction of an imaginary person,
a "mere type," would not be libelous, but that a publisher of a libel could lose if
"evidence is produced that reasonable people knowing some of the circumstances,
not necessarily all, would take the libel complained of to relate to the plaintiff .. "
Id. 582-83. Lord Justice Scrutton dismissed MGM's argument that to say a woman
was raped was not libelous with the acerbic observation "I really have no language
to express my opinion of that argument ....... Id. 584. Lord Justice Green
found that the depiction "could apply to no one but the plaintiff" and that "those
who knew anything whatsoever" would identify plaintiff. Id. 585. Although some
of the incidents were fictionalized, the "main fact" was that Prince Youssoupoff bad
killed Rasputin. Lord Justice Slesser added that a "substantial and reasonable"
number of persons had to connect plaintiff to the portrayal and that rape depictions
were libelous. Id. 587.
Hostility toward the mass media has been evident in some of the decisions. In
American Broadcasting-Paramount Theaters, Inc. v. Simpson, 106 Ga. App. 230,
126 S.E.2d 873 (1962), the court found that plaintiff, who had been assigned to
guard Al Capone at a time when Capone escaped, had a cause of action against
a television company that had dramatized the incident but had not used plaintifFs
name. The court noted that the program (an episode of "The Untouchables")
was a "dramatization of a 'stale' news event . . . ." and found that "the semi-
fictional portrayal of a real life event is fraught with the possibility that the public,
or at least that segment of the public that knows the plaintiffs, will believe that
the presentation refers to the plaintiff." Id. at 239, 243, 126 S.E.2d at 879, 881.
The startling aspect of the decision lay in the fact that the plaintiff was neither
named nor depicted, thus giving rise to the question whether the program was "of
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cases are old, the matter has rarely been analyzed in first amendment
terms.
B. The Use of a "Real" Name in a Fictional Context
What happens when an author chooses a name for a fictional
character, and the name coincides with that of a real (and outraged)
plaintiff? The answer depends upon whether the author has in-
tended to defame a real person through the medium of fiction (and
is reasonably understood to have so intended) or has inadvertently
chosen the name solely for the purpose of creating a fictional
character.
The classic case is E. H-ulton Co. v. Jones,45 a 1910 English
decision of the House of Lords that permitted one Artemus Jones
to sue a publisher who had used that name in an apparently fictional
work. The Hulton standard turned not on the author's intent, but
on the public's reasonable understanding of that intent:
The tort consisted in the use of language which people
might reasonably think to be defamatory of the plaintiff.
and concerning" him. In Kelly v. Loew's Inc., 76 F. Supp. 473 (D. Mass. 1948),
plaintiff, a naval officer, sued on account of his depiction in a motion picture, "They
Were Expendable". The movie was based on a novel of the same name; the book
"purports to be and in fact is a substantially accurate report of 'historical events."'
Id. 477. Although plaintiff was dramatized in the movie as a courageous man, he
was also depicted as headstrong and undisciplined (a characterization at variance
with that in the book). Despite the favorable portrayal:
[The law recognizes that the professional man's interest in not having
added to his career imaginary facts that tend to lessen his colleagues'
opinion of him, rises superior to the motion picture producer's interest in
embellishing a true story with colorful episodes not plainly stamped as
imaginary but designed to increased the popularity of the motion picture.
There were so many truthful elements . . . that the contrast in adherence
to professional concerns also tended to be true. Thus the representation
was an extreme of the maxim, "the greater the truth, the greater the libel."
Id. 486-87.
Plaintiff recovered $3,000 on account of such depiction.
In Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Stanley, 36 Ga. App. 85, 192 S.E. 300 (1937),
plaintiff, a former member of the Georgia Prison Commission, sued the makers of
the famous movie "I Was A Fugitive From a Chain Gang," on account of the
depiction of him as a bribe solicitor. The strange aspect of the case lay in the fact
that plaintiff never even claimed that he was portrayed in the movie, but rather
claimed that he was libeled in the book from which the movie was drawn. Since
the book and movie were prominently identified together and since the author of
the book also wrote the screenplay of the movie, the court found a sufficient nexus
at least to preclude dismissal of the bribery allegation.
4526 T.L.R. 128 (1909), discussed in Smith, supra note 21. For a remarkably
similar American case, see Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 53 Cal. App. 2d 207,
127 P.2d 577 (1942).
1978] LIBEL
1078 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
The appellants could not be heard to say that they did not
intend to injure or defame the plaintiffs, and the jury
might find that the defendants acted in good faith. But
these statements did not constitute a defence to the action.
46
Thus, although people who did not know the plaintiff would not
reasonably believe that he was being described, and people who
knew the plaintiff well would not so believe (because many of the
facts ascribed to Artemus Jones were not true of the plaintiff),
liability might nevertheless be found, as people who knew the plain-
tiff-but did not know him well-might have believed that he was
the subject of the article.
American courts have relied upon the case without making it
clear whether the finding of liability depended solely upon the
publisher's failure clearly to designate the work as fictional, or
whether, in addition, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that
the work was "of and concerning" him.4 7 After all, how many
Artemus Jones' can sue the publisher? In the absence of a defense
for inadvertently defaming a person, perhaps several plaintiffs-all
claiming that certain resemblances between the character depicted
and themselves led to a reasonable belief among their acquaintances
that each and every plaintiff was the subject matter of the account-
would prevail.48 Presumably, in a case such as this, the standard
disclaimer that the work was purely fictional would be dispositive;
of course, it would not be if the planitiff could show that the author
intended to defame him.
Where a work is both fictional and intended to be such, courts
have increasingly refused to rule in favor of plaintiffs bearing the
same name as that of the fictional character. The process of artistic
creation is a complex one that often involves the creation of charac-
ters bearing some resemblance to people the artist has known. "It
is generally understood that novels are written out of the back-
ground and experiences of the novelist. The characters portrayed
46 26 T.L.R. at 129.
47 See Powers v. Durgin-Snow Pub. Co., Inc., 154 Me. 108, 144 A.2d 294
(1958); Walker v. Bee-News Publ. Co., 122 Neb. 511, 240 N.W. 579 (1932);
Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 65, 126 N.E. 260, 263 (1920) (danger
is equal "whether such injury is the result of defendant's evil disposition towards
[plaintiff] or a mere concatenation of adventitious circumstances.").
4 8 See Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909) (inadvertent use of plaintiff's
picture in advertisement was "of and concerning" her and libelous); Bridgwood
v. Newspaper P.M., 194 Misc. 750, 87 N.Y.S.2d 482 (S. Ct. Queens Co. 1949)
(fact that words were intended to and did refer to existing person does not require
conclusion that they were not defamatory of another), Tev'd on other grounds, 276
App. Div. 858, 93 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1949).
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are fictional, but very often they grow out of real persons .... The
acorn of fact is usually the progenitor of the oak, which when full
grown no longer has any resemblance to the acorn." 49 Although this
generalization has no necessary connection with the use of the name
(in contrast to the depiction of other information) of a person, one
court even recognized an artistic freedom to use part of a "real"
name in the depiction of a fictional character.5 0
The choice of fictional name-common or uncommon-for a
fictional character has been protected, even where, by pure accident,
a person bearing the same name as well as other identifiable charac-
teristics of the fictional character, sued.51 This protection has not
49People v. Scribners Sons, 205 Misc. 818, 821 (Magis. Ct. Kings Co. 1954)
(dismissing criminal complaint by Joseph Maggio, the alleged model for the
character of Angelo Maggio in "From Here To Eternity" for violation of right to
privacy). Complainant served with James Jones, the author of the book and movie
at issue, and claimed that certain scenes in the work did actually occur and involved
him, but that other scenes were fictionalized.
50 Id.
51 In Clare v. Farrell, 70 F. Supp. 276 (D. Minn. 1947), the court held that
a newspaperman who had the same name as the name of the leading character, a
writer, in a novel about the latter's "sordid experiences" had no cause of action.
Although the name of the noiel was also that of plaintiff, the court noted that "it
is quite apparent from a reading of the book that it was intended as a work of
fiction." Id. 277. Since all Minnesota cases "state the test of libel in terms of
intent" and since the "story was intended to be entirely fictional . . . " and falsity
was admitted by plaintiff, it was not "of and concerning" him. Id. 278, 277.
Even if the author had been negligent, plaintiff could not have prevailed. Bewilder-
ingly, the court found that had the author intended "to write of and concerning
the plaintiff, the result . . . would appear to be no different." Id. 277. Jones v.
Hulton, 26 T.L.R. 128 (1909), and Harrison v. Smith, 20 L.T.R. (n.s.) 713 (1869),
were distinguished on the ground that the authors intended to write of real people.
There would be liability if the intent were to write about a real person, a "fictional"
name were used, and another person bearing that name sued.
In Smith v. Huntington Pub. Corp., 410 F. Supp. 1270, 1272 (S.D. Ohio 1975),
the court held that, in a situation involving a "remarkable set of facts" the use
of some real names in a newspaper story labelled fictional was not libelous. The
"remarkable set of facts" were that the story, undoubtedly defamatory, used names
of real people, in a small town, identified the age the child plaintiff correctly, and
identified the mother as a participant in a drug abuse program. Citing Clare, the
court-declared test was whether an average reader "might reasonably believe that
the article concerned the plaintiff on the basis of the age, residence, and name."
Id. 1273. The "fictional" label attached to the piece, while not a complete defense,
raised the issue whether "a reasonable person could reasonably believe that the
article referred to the plaintiff." Id. 1274. Applying Illinois' "innocent construction
rule" the court relied upon "the obvious and plain meaning of the [disclamatory]
words therein" to grant summary judgment for defendant. Id.
Prior to Sullivan, in Wheeler v. Dell Pub. Co., 300 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1962),
the Seventh Circuit found that plaintiff, allegedly depicted in a novel, "Anatomy
of a Murder," a "fictionalized version" of a famous trial, could not recover since "any
reasonable person who . . . was in a position to identify Hazel Wheeler with [the
fictional] Janice Quill would more likely conclude that the author created the latter
in an ugly way so that none would identify her with Hazel Wheeler." Since
"suggestion is not identification," the depiction was not "of and concerning" plaintiff
even though the "fictional locale is fairly identifiable with the actual." Id. 376, 375.
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been extended to publications where it is not clear that the name
is fictional and is intended to be fictional.52 In the latter case, the
Hulton rationale has prevailed. With this one exception, modern
libel law has largely repudiated the doctrine that it "is not so much
who was aimed at as who was hit" 53 in the case of fiction.
The seemingly reasonable result thus reached, however, does
not contemplate-or protect-a work of faction like The Public
Burning. No doubt Coover intended to write fiction, yet his
selection of named historical personages as principal characters was
hardly inadvertent, and the developments noted above-which im-
munize writers of fiction from suit by real people fortuitously named
-simply will not be sufficient.
C. Names and Symbols: "Real" Names in Hypothetical Contexts
An inevitable attribute of faction is the use of real names (and
the persons they represent) to depict not only actual, but often
symbolic, conduct. Thus, for instance, a reader of The Public
Burning could reasonably conclude that the "Richard Nixon" de-
picted therein is an amalgam of the real Richard Nixon and a
symbolic addition. The amalgam poses special problems for the
law of libel. Presumably, a parody of Richard Nixon-wherein
Nixon's known speech and conduct are mimicked or exaggerated-
would be protected as fair comment.5 4 In contrast, the choice of
Richard Nixon as a vehicle for a wide-ranging commentary upon
various aspects of American life may simply be deemed to be too
arbitrary a symbol to withstand a claim of defamation.55 After
52 Eg., Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P.2d 577 (1942).
53 Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 63-64, 126 N.E. 260, 262 (1920).
54 If not, then a generation of humorists, including Lenny Bruce and David
Frye, would have been put out of business. If not, then Gore Vidal's play, "An
Evening with Richard Nixon And . . ." would have been subject to liability.
Interestingly, the play only used Nixon's real words; the true comedy (and savagery)
came in the physical portrayal of Nixon. A leading American novelist, Philip Roth,
parodied Nixon's style in Our Gang: "Our Gang is out to destroy the protective
armor of 'dignity' that shields anyone in an office as high and powerful as the
Presidency .... But rather than accept his 'official' estimate of himself, which we
see for Mr. Nixon is very regal indeed, I prefer to place him in a baggy-pants
burlesque skit. It seems to me more appropriate." P. Roth, On Our Gang, in
READNG MysEri mN OTHERS 46-47 (1975).
That such expression deviates from traditional forms of political commentary
or may appear more entertaining than informative does not alter its protected status.
Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 449-50, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501,
507-08 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1968). See also Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507,
510 (1948).
55 In a similar context, defendant claimed that his work did not infringe plain-
tiff's copyrighted song but merely burlesqued it. The court rejected this defense:
"Defendants may have sought to parody life, or more particularly sexual mores and
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all, why pick on a living person? Why not create a fictional one, if
the object is to comment upon a broad phenomenon? If Coover
could create a mythical figure to sodomize "Richard Nixon," why
could he not create an equally mythical American politician, not
called Richard Nixon, to be the object of the sexual act? Yet
choosing among such options constitutes a significant part of the
creative process. It is the general statement condensed into and
suggested by one familiar personality that lends the book its
driving force, and no wholly fictional character could embody as
persuasively the contradictions and illnesses of the American psyche
of the 1950's. Indeed, Nixon is portrayed as being as much a
victim as a perpetrator of the anti-communist hysteria of that era.
In that role, he is at times sympathetic, at times ludicrous, at times
calculating and devious, but always complex. 6 What is lost in
sharply-focused satire is gained in the ability to generate an image of
a whole society in one character.
The novel of faction is not unique in its refusal to acknowledge
a distinction between the public self and the private self. It is a
phenomenon of the modem novel, and, indeed, of modem popular
culture as well. Television talk shows, popular magazines, and
confessional best sellers by celebrities exemplify the trend toward
self (at times, even shameful) exposure. 57  "Serious" best sellers
about Richard Nixon speculate about his marital sex life, and other
books probe his mind.58 Although Nixon was unique in his willing-
ness to expose otherwise private aspects of his life 59-perhaps to
the point of his waiving any claim to privacy-there is an "inherent
difficulty.., in determining which characteristics of a public figure,
particularly of a public official, do in any way affect his public
posture and consequently, his public activities." 60 Certainly, in a
taboos, but it does not appear that they attempted to comment ludicrously upon
. . . ." a song, that which provided the vehicle for the parody. MCA, Inc. v.
Wilson, 425 F. Supp. 443, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
6 After discovering that the prosecution had to do "a lot of backstage scene-
rigging . . . ," the fictional Nixon regrets that the Rosenbergs had to die.
R. Coova, Tim Punuc BUwRiG 81, 84 (1977). When he meets Ethel ]Rosenberg,
he uses her first name with "feeling" and realizes that "I really didn't want her to
die"; they end the scene by crying together. Id. 433, 442.
57 See D.J. Booasnx, From Hero to Celebrity: The Human Pseudo Event, in
TaE IfAGE 45-76 (1962).
58 E.g., C. BEmNsxTEw & P, WOODWAuD, TEM FNAL DAYs (1976); C. B ms-raz
& R. WooDwAD, ALL RE PRs-MENT's MfE (1974); J. DE"r, Bwmw ATmmIoN
(1976).
591R. NhxoN, Six Cmrsxs (1962).
60 Naughton & Gilbertson, Libelous Ridicule by Journalists, 18 CLEv. ST. L.
Rtv. 450, 455 (1969).
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post-Sullivan world, the developments of both popular and serious
culture argue for legal recognition of the blurring of traditional
lines between the inner and the outer selves.
If both popular and serious culture sanction an inquisitiveness
about public figures' private lives, then the scope of artistic license
must be delineated more broadly than it has been. Community
standards have always been relevant to a determination of precisely
what is libelous and courts have often recognized that such standards
may leave much to be desired: "[T]he segment of the public which
thinks odiously of a plaintiff because of the facts stated in the
[defendant's] publication . . . [need not be] 'right-thinking . ... '
[so long as] it be 'substantial' and 'respectable.' "61 Thus, "the
community in truth is not highly judicial as to the factors which in
combination form the opinion or reputation of a man held by his
fellow men." 62 Although this axiom has often been utilized to find
liability in the case of ambiguous utterances, it also suggests that
there is a sense of irony within our own psyches that appreciates-
perhaps craves-crass insult of those in high positions. How different
is the literary deflation of historical persons from the more generally-
directed-and therefore non-libelous-satire of, say, Jonathan Swift?
To ask a satirist to be in good taste is like asking a love
poet to be less personal. Is The Satyricon in good taste?
Is A Modest Proposal? Swift recommends the stewing,
roasting, and fricaseeing of one-year old children ....
How nasty and vulgar that must have seemed .... Imag-
ine how this went down in polite society: "A child will
make two dishes at an Entertainment for Friends; and
when the Family dines alone, the fore or hind quarter will
make a reasonable dish, and seasoned with a little Pepper
or Salt will be very good Boiled on the fourth Day, espe-
cially in Winter . . . ." Now that's considered Literature.
It's called Swiftian. Back in 1729 it probably seemed, to a
lot of Swift's contemporaries, bad taste and worse.63
Finally, the judiciary should be aware of the hypocrisy factor:
juries may well find liability for works they publicly abhor but
61 Herrmann v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 49 NJ. Super. 551, 555, 140
A.2d 529, 531 (1958). Plaintiff was depicted as a supporter of municipal employees'
right to plead the fifth amendment, and as sympathetic toward communists: "We
must take public opinion and mental reactions as we find them in living society,
not as one might visualize them in a Utopia." Id. at 558, 140 A.2d at 532.
62 Lyman v. New England Pub. Co., 286 Mass. 258, 262, 190 N.E. 542,
544 (1934).
6 p. Ro=i supra note 54, at 47.
secretly enjoy. Proper instructions regarding actual rather than
ideal community standards would probably be required in order to
preclude such a result, especially in cases involving serious works of
art.64
Although there have been no reported cases involving factional-
ization, insofar as that format obviously distorts what is known
and clearly creates the verbal equivalent of an optical illusion about
a person, it strongly resembles the situation in Burton v. Crowell
Publishing Co.65 In that case, a distinguished Second Circuit panel
concurred with Judge Learned Hand's finding that a picture of
plaintiff (in an advertisement) holding a saddle in such a way as to
make it appear that the pommel was an extension of his genitalia
was "grotesque, monstrous, and obscene" 66-and libelous. Although
"[n]obody could be fatuous enough to believe any of these things;
everybody would at once see that it was the camera, and the camera
alone, that had made the unfortunate mistake . . . [so that the ad
was] patently an optical illusion . . . ," (, the resulting picture ex-
posed the plaintiff to overriding ridicule. This would augur badly
for ludicrous depictions in the novel of faction, except that Judge
Hand shrewdly noted that the portrayal resembled "a verbal utter-
ance which expressly declared that it was false." 68 The latter, he
observed, could be "so guarded [as not] to carry any sting, but the
same is not true of caricatures . *.".." 69 For Judge Hand, one
64 It is hardly an ideal world in which juries are asked to employ "community
standards" to such questions as whether a work is a "true parody or a mere subter-
fuge," Yankvich, Parody and Burlesque in the Law of Copyright, 33 CAN. BAn
REv. 1130, 1152 (1955), or whether a character is merely being held up to ridicule
or, rather, being used as a vehicle for "higher truths." It seems unlikely that the
guidelines will be any more specific than those sanctioned in the "serious literary
• . . value" inquiry in obscenity cases. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24
(1973). See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
65 82 F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1936). See also Dali v. Time, Inc., 252 App. Div.
636, 300 N.Y.S. 680, aff'd, 278 N.Y. 635, 16 N.E.2d 297 (1937), in which Time
magazine had analogized the suicide of a prominent foreign public official to the
hypothetical suicide of plaintiff, a well-known American. Defendant argued that
the "purely imaginary and supposed parallel tragedy . . .was published without
malice solely for the purpose of comparison .. " Id. 682. Despite the fact that
it was "obviously fictitious, a mere figment of the writer's imagination. . . ," id.
685, the result was to expose plaintiff to ridicule, and the presentation was deemed
to be libelous.
66 82 F.2d at 154.
67 Id. 155.
68 Id.
69 Id. "Such a caricature affects a man's reputation . . . the association so
established may be beyond repair; he may become known indefinitely as the absurd
victim of this unhappy mischance." Id.
See also Zbyszko v. New York American, Inc., 228 App. Div. 277, 239 N.Y.S.
411 (1930) (photograph of well-known wrestler placed next to "hideous looking"
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picture was indeed worth a thousand words. Would a plethora of
"verbal utterances" be "so guarded" in a serious and complex work
of literature so as to constitute something more than caricature?
Not so in 1936 or a few years later, but perhaps it would be today.
Ten years after Burton, a derogatory and untrue picture, when
considered in the context of an article that was both .true and
favorable to the plaintiff, was held not to be libelous, in Blake v.
Hearst Publications, Inc. 70 The case demonstrates that any creative
work-including a work of faction-must be judged as a whole in
ascertaining whether an isolated passage is libelous.
D. The "Of and Concerning" Requirement
One possible defense to an action attacking a novel of faction
is the assertion that the symbolic portrayal in question is not "of
and concerning" the plaintiff. The "of and concerning" require-
ment posed a substantial dilemma for plaintiffs in the traditional
fiction cases, which dealt with works that did not utilize the com-
plainants' real names. In such a case, the plaintiff must demon-
strate "considerable truth" in order to create the requisite identifica-
tion with the ostensibly fictional character, while simultaneously
claiming defamatory falsity.7 1 This curious paradox has had the
effect of affording considerable protection to publishers.72
ape in article contending that the man was "'[nlot [flundamentally [dlifferent from
the [glorilla in [pihysique,"' id. at 278, 239 N.Y.S. at 412, held libel per se).
7075 Cal. App. 2d 6, 170 P.2d 100 (1946). Plaintiff was a counter-espionage
agent in World War II, and a cartoon depicting him as disheveled and in a disguise,
though not accurate, accompanied a favorable article. "Obviously, the cartoons
were not meant to be a true portrayal of [plaintiff's] . . . physical appearance, but
rather were intended to represent the part he played as a counter-spy." Id. at 11,
170 P.2d at 103.
71 Cases on this point, demonstrating the decisiveness of factual nuances, are
legion. For example, in Wright v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 55 F. Supp. 639, 640
(D. Mass. 1944), a motion picture derived from a novel changed just enough names
and incidents to be immune to a libel claim. "The motion picture omitted or
changed a lot of details which might have served to tie up [plaintiffs'] . . . char-
acters with the characters in the book." A critical finding was that there was no
evidence that anyone in plaintiffs' community thought that the movie characters
"portrayed or identified those plaintiffs." Id. 641.
The Fourth Circuit, in a post-Sullivan opinion, found that an "obvious work
of fiction" in a magazine article that utilized names of actual streets and places did
not identify plaintiff sufficiently to be "of and concernin" him, since the person
depicted was of a different age and there was no parallel between the real and the
fictional character. Middlebrooks v. Curtis Pub. Co., 413 F.2d 141, 143 (4th Cir.
1969). The court cautioned that "of course the fictional setting does not insure
immunity when a reasonable man would understand that the fictional character
was a portrayal of the plaintiff." Id. See P. WrrrmNBan, DAN~anouS WORDS 87-92
(1947).
72 Thus, a "wholly fictional. . . 'narration of imaginary events"' consisting of the
"portaiture of imaginary characters'" with "no attempt . . . directly or inferentially
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In non-fictional treatments, the "of and concerning" require-
ment has presented problems similar to those involving the "inad-
vertent" identification situations. Is the publication "of and con-
cerning" the mistakenly named person (often where his name
uncannily resembles that of the intended person) or is the work "of
and concerning" the intended person? If the former, should some
negligence principle be applied, or should the publisher shoulder
the risk of mistake under all circumstances? The difficulty is, of
course, compounded by the fact that a "real person" was named, and
may be further complicated by the fact that what is known about
that person may bear some resemblance to the facts furnished in the
depiction. Oliver Wendell Holmes simply applied the common law
rule that the "inevitable consequence" of a libelous publication
was to defame the person actually named.73 For Holmes, liability
"in tort for the natural consequences of a manifestly injurious act"
dictated the results. 7- Holmes' opinion was a dissenting one in a
case where the majority found that the publication was, in fact, "of
and concerning" only the intended person.75 The interesting issue
is, of course, whether anyone bearing the name in question (a large
number of potential plaintiffs, if the name were a common one)
could sue, at least where there were other resemblances. Could
both the person actually named and the person intended have sued
for libel had the statement been false as to both? Since the majority
of jurisdictions ruling on this issue have adopted Holmes' view, the
question is not an idle one.
76
to create any other impression . . . ." and with no resemblance between plaintiff
and any character, precluded recovery when plaintiff's business name was fleetingly
used in a television crime drama. Landau v. CBS, 205 Misc. 357, 360, 128 N.Y.S.
2d 254, 257 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1954) (quoting 4 New English Dictionary 187
(Oxford 1901)) (citations omitted).
73 Hanson v. Globe Newspaper Co., 159 Mass. 293, 301, 34 N.E. 462, 465
(1893) (dissenting opinion). The article had stated that "H.P. Hanson," the
plaintiff, a real estate broker, was in prison when it intended to name "A.P.H.
Hanson," also a former real estate broker.
74 Id. at 303, 34 N.E. at 465.
75 The court feared that any person named "H.P. Hanson" could sue so that
"one who has justifiably published the truth of a person might be liable to several
persons of the same name, of whom the language would be untrue." Id. at 299,
34 N.E. at 464 (opinion of the court).
76 See, e.g., Whitcomb v. Hearst Corp., 329 Mass. 193, 107 N.E.2d 295 (1952)
(mistake in magazine article as to the identity of an American soldier court-martialed
in Germany); Coats v. The News Corp., 355 Mo. 778, 197 S.W.2d 958 (1946)
(mistaken use of plaintiff's picture in article about jailbreak by person with same
name as plaintiff); Laudati v. Stea, 44 R.I. 303, 306, 117 A. 422, 424 (1922)
("The question is not who was aimed at, but who was hit."); Corrigan v. Bobbs-
Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260 (1920). See generally W. PnossMI, TouTs
§ 113 (4th ed. 1971).
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If the novel -of faction were to be classed with the cases of
reportage that generated the broad, objective "of and concerning"
test, it would be unsheltered in the realm of libel. There are
reasons, however, why the characters in a book like The Public
Burning should not be considered to be "of and concerning" their
real-life namesakes. First, it is error to assume that, because a work
of faction impresses one as somewhat "historical" or "realistic," it is
any less fictional than the purest fantasy or romance.77 Coover's
mode of expression-his naming of names-is but one novelist's
device for representing reality; it is a device to engage the reader; it
is a literary genre. For the law to approach it any differently than
it does conventional fiction 78 would be to construct a distinction
without a difference. A second and related point derives from the
fundamental principle of literary criticism that a first-person nar-
rator is not to be identified with the real-life author. Indeed, the
ironic distance created between author and persona can be one of
the most telling effects of any fiction. Just as a first-person narrator
is not the author, a named third person narrator-"Richard Nixon"
-is not (to the literary, if not the legal mind) the historical person.
The distance between the speculative "Nixon" of The Public
Burning and the historical person is obvious and pointed; what
makes good literary sense should have some legal relevance.
E. False Comment as Fair Comment
The novel of faction is a form of social and political criticism.
Often, the author describes opinions in the form of fictionalized
facts, since that form of expression is inherent in the novel as an
77 Professors Scholes and Kellogg operate under this same principle in describing
19th century fiction:
The novel's great virtue lay in finding a way to combine the tragic concern
for the individual with the comic concern for society. That the novelists
called this impulse "realism" and felt that they had arrived at the ultimate
way of representing "realit" must not deceive us. Theirs was simply a
new decorum, more easily achieved in narrative than drama, and itself
subject to alteration as new ways of conceiving of the individual and
society became available. The new sciences of psychology and sociology
had their inevitable effect on the artistic representation of the individual
and society, providing new schemes of meaning and new kinds of plotting
for the use of narrative artists; but they also disputed with art for the
control of the representation of actuality, driving both narrative and
dramatic art ultimately away from essentially mimetic or realistic
formulations.
R. Scnorus & R. KELLOGG, supra note 10, at 231. The psychological novel, and
Coover's similar exposure of personal and national psyches, are the end point of the
process described by Scholes and Kellogg. That such present modes are also
"simply a new decorum" should be obvious.
78 See text accompanying notes 51-53 supra.
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art form. Speculation about motives is rife, as it is in psycho-history
and psycho-biography. To understand whether the novel of faction
is fair comment, it is necessary to understand the origin of the rule
and modem developments surrounding it.
At least a century and a half prior to Sullivan, the courts had
recognized that prohibition of criticism of public figures or creative
or performing artists could lead to a virtual monopoly in the realm
of ideas. As one early court put it:
[Authors] should be liable to criticism, to exposure, and
even to ridicule, if their compositions be ridiculous; other-
wise the first who writes a book on any subject will main-
tain a monopoly of sentiment and opinions respecting it.
This would tend to perpetuity of error.79
The' common law privilege in its majority formulation is said to
have encompassed only statements of opinion, with a substantial
minority of courts extending the privilege to false statements of
fact made without malice about public servants.80 Some cases
maintained that vituperative opinion might be libelous even if
premised on true facts.81 In any event, tradition has given way to
something approaching carte blanche, at least as to vigor of expres-
sion,82 and what might be called an ethic of free competition in ideas
has steadily developed into a quasi-constitutional protection for
strongly-worded criticism of public or artistic affairs. Under the
70 Carr v. Hood, 1 Carnpb. 354, 357 (1808), quoted in Guitar v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 1042, 1047 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd mem. 538 F.2d 309
(2d Cir. 1976). Among the myriad pre-Sullivan common law fair comment cases
are McCarthy v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 101 Ohio App. 297, 136 N.E.2d 393
(1956) (newscaster leading local antifluoridation campaign is "public figure" of
whom facetious criticism is protected as fair comment) and Hartmann v. Boston
Herald-Traveler Corp., 323 Mass. 56, 61, 63, 80 N.E.2d 16, 19 (1948) (articles
condemning peace movement during wartime protected, as "[flair comment may be
severe and may include ridicule, sarcasm, and invective.").
sOW. Pnosssm, supra note 76, at 819-20. The minority rule evolved into
the constitutional privilege. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
81 E.g., Maidman v. Jewish Publications, Inc., 54 Cal. 2d 643, 649, 355 P.2d
265, 268, 7 Cal. Rptr. 617, 620 (1960). The court held that "[clomments, opinions
and criticisms may be defamatory even though based upon true or privileged state-
ments of fact. The publisher is liable unless the comments themselves are priv-
ileged." Thus, an editorial containing "sarcasm and derision" about a particularly
tender subject-a lawyer's knowledge of his own religious practices-was found to
be actionable libel. Cf. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Brautigam, 127 So. 2d 718 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (absolute factual truth predicate to invoking privilege for
vitriolic comment on public official).
82 Beauhanais v. Pittsburgh Courier Pub. Co., 243 F.2d 705, 706, 708 (7th
Cir. 1957) (calling plaintiff, outspoken racial segregationist, "sinister" and "more
dangerous than the nation's worst gangster," is fair comment despite "strong
language").
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influence of Sullivan, increasing amounts of hyperbole and vitu-
peration, formerly libelous, have been judicially transmuted into
the category of protected opinion.n Even if the statement that a
plaintiff's book is pornography implies that the plaintiff is a pornog-
rapher, the implication is protected.84  Formerly rigid elements-
especially those of absolute factual truth and "fairness" whereby
only the public acts of the politician or the works of the artist could
be legitimately criticized, and not his private life-have given way
to newer, more flexible distinctionss 5 Some factual misstatement is
83 See Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970)
("blackmail," used as term of obvious hyperbole, constitutionally protected); Buckley
v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976) ("fascist" protected as opinion, though
"liar" as applied to journalist is not); Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378, 384
(4th Cir. 1971) (use of figurative, hyperbolic speech by press protected); Guitar v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 1042, 1048 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (phrase
"seeming hypocrisy" aimed at plaintiff's book protected as fair comment). But see
Edwards v. National Audubon Soc. Inc., 556 F.2d 113, 121 n.5 (2d Cir. 1977)
("paid liar" defamatory per se).
Prior to Sullivan, hyperbole directed at public figures was not always protected.
Lightfoot v. Jennings, 363 Mo. 878, 254 S.W.2d 596 (1953); Crosby v. Rockland
County Citizen Pub. Co., 232 N.Y.S.2d 819 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 1962),
mod. sub nom. Crosby v. Reilly, 20 App. Div. 2d 561, 246 N.Y.S.2d 59 (1963).
84 Buckley v. Vidal, 327 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
85In Kapiloff v. Dunn, 27 Md. App. 514, 343 A.2d 251 (Ct. Spec. App. 1975),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976), the court noted that opinions per se were not
immunized by Sullivan or Gertz. A newspaper that had rated a local school prin-
cipal unsuitable for his job and had stated the standards for such judgment pre-
vailed. "[T]he Supreme Court broadened the possible scope of the fair comment
defense. It did not create an absolute privilege for all expressions of opinion."
Id. at 530, 343 A.2d at 262. Rather,
When such commentary is not based upon stated facts or upon facts other-
wise known or readily available to the general public, it is treated as a
factual statement and possible constitutional immunity is determined on
that basis. Where the statements, however, are ... based upon stated or
readily known facts, their objective truth or falsity depends on the veracity
of these underlying facts. Therefore, any determinations with regard to
falsity or the presence of actual malice must look to the stated or known
facts which form the basis for the opinion ....
Id. at 533, 343 A.2d at 264.
Kapiloff has been interpreted to mean that "[olpinions based on false facts are
actionable only against a defendant who had knowledge of the falsity or probable
falsity of the underlying facts." Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 913
(2d Cir. 1977). Thus, a publisher or a writer quoting someone else and who, in
fact, has no knowledge or suspicion of falsity, is protected, at least where the pub-
lished "allegations were not of such an extraordinary nature as would suggest a
high probability of falsity." Id. "Where a passage is incapable of independent
verification, and where there are no convincing indicia of unreliability, publication
of the passage cannot constitute reckless disregard for the truth." Id. 914.
Even after Sullivan, one court found that an opinion about the value of a work
of art must be based upon either known facts or facts readily available to the
reader to whom the opinion is addressed, but that the critic is not required to state
the facts under these circumstances. Fisher v. Washington Post Co., 212 A.2d 335
(D.C. Ct. App. 1965).
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increasingly permissible, and, indeed, for certain kinds of opinions,
no factual basis need be stated at all.88
A rule akin to "fair comment" has been developed to protect
the dramatization and fictionalization of events of great public in-
terest, in invasion of privacy cases.8 7 In Leopold v. Levin,88 both
the motion picture and the novel Compulsion, based upon the
famous Leopold-Loeb case (involving the notorious and wanton
murder of a child in 1924) were immunized against an invasion of
privacy claim brought by one of the killers. The similarities be-
tween Compulsion and the novel of faction are substantial; the
only difference is that Compulsion did not use the real names of
the parties. In denying recovery to the plaintiff, the court alluded
to the fact that "[wv]hile... [Compulsion] was 'suggested' by... [the
original case, it was] evidently fictional and dramatized .a.. ,, a
description that applies forcefully to the novel of faction. The
subject matter of Compulsion was one of "enduring public atten-
tion ... [and] . . . an American cause celebre. ... 0 Despite
the fictitious additions (going beyond the names of the killers), "the
core of the novel and film and their dominating subjects were a
part of the plaintiff's life which he had caused to be placed in public
view." 91 Faction inevitably involves a judgment as to the "core of
the work"; in The Public Burning, the "core" is the Rosenberg
case, a matter certainly as notorious as the Leopold-Loeb killing.
The Levin decision also found that the "fictionalized aspects of the
book and motion picture were reasonably comparable to, or con-
ceivable from facts of record ...or minor in offensiveness when
viewed in the light of such facts." 92 Given the heavily "factual"
context of The Public Burning, the same can be said of it. Other
factors that supported the finding that no invasion of privacy had
occurred were (a) the evident nature of the "fictional and drama-
tized materials," and (b) the fact that those materials "were not
86 See Golden North Airways, Inc. v. Tanana Pub, Co., 218 F.2d 612, 627 (9th
Cir. 1954).
87 These cases often verge on libel. Usually, the only difference is that the
privacy action does not litigate reputational interests. A merger between the two
theories may be accelerated by the Supreme Court's application of Sullivan to both,
see authorities cited note 95 infra, and by Firestone's generous allowance of non-
reputational damages, 424 U.S. at 460-61.
8845 Ill. 2d 434, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970).
s9ld. at 445, 259 N.E.2d at 256.
90 Id. at 441, 259 N.E.2d at 254.
91 Id. at 443, 259 N.E.2d at 255.
921d., 259 N.E.2d at 256.
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represented to be otherwise." 93 The sheer mass of fact in The
Public Burning may make it difficult to sort out historical fact from
the author's creations, yet this is so simply because fact and fiction
together have become subject to the author's personal vision; an
implicit statement of the book is that factual history, stripped of its
mythological component, does not tell the full story. The symbolic
nature of the whole remains evident. Since, in Levin, the depictions
were "substantially creative works of fiction," the knowing or reck-
less falsity tests of Time, Inc. v. Hill 94 were held not even to be
applicable to this particular literary form. Of course, Levin in-
volved privacy rather than libel, but the thin line between the two
should not justify a radically different result.95 Indeed, the Hill
privacy test is the same as the Sullivan libel test,9 and the court
held it to be simply irrelevant to a work of creative fiction.
Has a rule that might be termed the "any comment" test re-
placed the conceptual inadequacies of the fair comment formula-
tion? 97 The expansion of fair comment to its outermost boundaries
has not yet formally transformed it into a new doctrine; one has
93Id. at 445, 259 N.E.2d at 256.
94385 U.S. 374 (1967). A pre-Sullivan case refused to find an invasion of
privacy when a television network broadcast a "fictionalized dramatization based on
the plaintiff's conviction, and pardon." Bernstein v. N.B.C., 129 F. Supp. 817, 819
(D.D.C. 1955). Although the "incidents were fictionalized for dramatic effect" and
the actor portraying plaintiff resembled him as he looked twenty years prior to the
program, plaintiff had no cause of action because
[ilf the telecast adhered to the facts, plaintiff has no cause of action, for
there was no actionable invasion of his privacy by use of incidents in his
life without identification. If the telecast was more fiction than fact, plain-
tiff cannot complain, for there was no identification of him as the central
figure by defendant and nothing defamatory.
Id. 837 (footnote omitted). As in Levin, plaintiff's name was not used. Unlike
Levin, there was not even a suggestion that the portrayal. was based upon plaintiff's
case. Since plaintiff had not sued for defamation, an interesting question is whether
the last sentence quoted above would have precluded such an action for failure to
meet the "of and concerning" requirement.
95, See note 87 supra. Should Sullivan be applicable to "false light" invasion of
privacy? See Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment
Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CArLa. L. m~v. 935 (1968);
Silver, Privacy and the First Amendment, 34 FonnDAm_ L. REv. 553 (1966).
96 385 U.S. at 390-91.
97 See W. PTossza, supra note 76, at 820. In Hogan v. New York Times Co.,
313 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1963), the Times was held liable for describing a police raid
upon a dice game as a fiasco and "keystone comedy." The court found the evidence
sufficient for a jury to find that the "Times' sole purpose in publishing the article
was to amuse its readers at the expense of plaintiffs." Id. 356. The court even
suggested that the story was not newsworthy, had only "entertainment value," and
that there was "no need that the story be written at all." Id. A dissent contended
that "the evidence must demonstrate that the Times' sole purpose was to amuse its
readers" and that, in this case, there was a "legitimate additional purpose." Id. 358
(emphasis in original). The dissenting judge argued that it was "important to
maintain unimpaired the privilege of poking fun at public officials." Id.
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only to read the Goldwater case to ascertain this.98 Yet, it must also
be remembered that Goldwater involved not a work of creative art,
but a claim of clinical mental illness set out in the magazine Fact.
Certainly, the edges of fair comment have become blurred in cases
involving public figures, and there appear to be few remaining
edges when creative art is considered.99
It is ironic that the victor in the Goldwater case was the sub-
ject of unremitting satire-both verbal and pictorial-during his
disastrous presidential campaign in 1964. Apparently, affixing the
"scientific" label of insanity to his persona was an actionable event,
while depicting his public policies as insane was not. The staple
fare of satirists such as Russell Baker and Art Buchwald has, of
course, been to sweep broadly, if gently. In times of great public
passion, satire becomes bitter, caustic, and vituperative. The mor-
dant satirist is regarded by his contemporaries as an exemplar of
bad taste. To the satirist who "stings," it is the world that is in
bad taste. In the case of a Swift, a Moli6re, or an Orwell, history
often agrees. Fair comment appears adequately to protect formal
98 In Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1049 (1970), plaintiff, a United States Senator, sued Fact magazine for pub-
lishing an allegedly libelous article about him during a presidential campaign in
which he was the Republican Party nominee. A group of psychiatrists was asked
whether he was "psychologically fit" to be president and the "highly selective"
results of that poll, purporting to find mental illness, were "edited" by defendants
to impute such illness. Defendants' use of secondary sources to support their find-
ings was held not to be protected under Sullivan. The court cited two reasons for
this. First, defendants either knew the secondary sources were "inherently im-
probable," or had "obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the person quoted or
the accuracy of his reports." Id. 337. Second, one of the defendants had "added
certain innuendos" to the quoted material, and "quoted other statements out of
context in order to support his predetermined result." Id. Since a false account of
insanity or mental illness, even of public officials, is libel per se, plaintiffs, having
proven a knovingly false account under Sullivan, prevailed. He was awarded $1.00
compensatory damages, $25,000 punitive damages against defendant Ginzburg, and
$50,000 punitive damages against the magazine.
Where clinical findings (or purported clinical diagnoses) of mental illness are
not involved, loose accusations in the course of public debate may be protected.
"We do not believe that the . . . viewers [of a television news program noted for
controversy and pungency] would understand the words 'paranoid' and "schizophrenic'
to refer to an actual physiological or mental affliction of . . . [plaintiff]." Fram v.
Yellow Cab Co., 380 F. Supp. 1314, 1329 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
99 In Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1968), the court found that a commercial poster of a presidential
candidate was protected against a claim of invasion of privacy (in the form of
invasion of the right of publicity). Public officials or participants in the public
arena "have traditionally been the fairest of all game for unbridled, unrestrained
public comment and criticism ranging from the ridiculous to the scurrilous. Limita-
tions upon the permissible in political expression are almost nonexistent." Id. at
449, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 507. The poster was held to be "a form of public interest
presentation .... That the format may deviate from traditional patterns of political
commentary or that to some it may appear more entertaining than informing, would
not alter its [constitutionally] protected status." Id. at 450, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 507-08.
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criticism of even bitter expression, but there is a conflict between
fair comment and the "ridicule" wing of libel.
F. The "Ridicule" Wing of "Hatred, Ridicule, and Contempt"
The requirements for prima facie libel are traditionally met by
an allegation that a person's reputation has been diminished by
ridicule.100 While "mere ridicule is not lil3elous . . . ridicule that
injures Reputation-that has a tendency to deprive a man of normal
social relations-is libelous." 101 Since ridicule often refers to a
characterization of a person rather than a statement of defamatory
fact, it is permitted somewhat more leeway than is normally ac-
corded solemn charges that engender hatred. A certain thick skin
is needed in society. Also, ridicule, burlesque-deflation of the high,
the mighty, and the pompous-has been, and remains, a unique art
100W. Pnossun, supra note 76, at 742-43 (citing cases). See, e.g., Fowler v.
Curtis Publ. Co., 78 F. Supp. 303, 304 (D.D.C. 1948); Berry v. City of New York
Ins. Co., 210 Ala. 369, 98 So. 2d 290 (1923) (irony may be libelous as form of
ridicule); Powers v. Durgin-Snow Publ. Co., 154 Me. 108, 144 A.2d 294 (1958)
(plaintiff made out to be "odd or unusual character"); Triggs v. Sun Printing &
Pub]. Ass'n, 179 N.Y. 144, 71 N.E. 739 (1904) (parody of Romeo and Juliet
ridiculing English professor is actionable).
One court found that humor could be divided into three categories: that which
is intended to defame and can be readily so understood, that which does not intend
to defame but which is susceptible to defamatory interpretation, and that which
neither intends to defame nor is reasonably susceptible of such an interpretation.
A statement that a well-known singer was an "iron-clad singing member of the
Mafia" fell into the second category, but was not defamatory where all realized it
was a joke. Amo v. Stewart, 245 Cal. App. 2d 955, 958, 54 Cal. Rptr. 392, 394
(1966).
The standards used in identifying "ridicule" are often elastic. For example, a
woman's honor was protected in McFadden v. Morning Journal Ass'n, 28 App. Div.
508, 51 N.Y.S. 275 (1898), from a story alleging that plaintiff and another woman
engaged in a rowing race to win the favor of a man. The somewhat fusty opinion
found that plaintiff was depicted as "ridiculous, immodest, and forward ... [which
portrayal gave rise to the] suggestive suspicion that the woman guilty of such
behavior was loose in conduct and ready for adventure, without regard to the
becoming modesty of a woman." Id. 280. The court awarded plaintiff $3,000 for
libel per se (there being no proof of special damages) on the theory that "humor
at the expense of the plaintiff, in holding her up to public ridicule" was actionable.
Id. Similarly, in Kirman v. Sun Printing & Publ. Co., 99 App. Div. 367, 91 N.Y.S.
193 (1904), an entirely fictitious story about a marriage which did not take place
due to the groom's failure to appear "ridiculed" the alleged bride sufficiently to
create liability.
1oR R. PHELPs & E. HAm ILTON, LmiL 50 (1966). Ridicule "must be more than
a jest, more than a mere shaft of humor; it must carry some kind of sting that harms
a person's reputation." Id. "It is indeed not true that all ridicule . . . is action-
able; a man must not be too thin-skinned or a self-important prig; but this advertise-
ment [a photograph suggesting that a saddle pommel was an extension of a man's
genitalia] was more than what only a morbid person would not laugh off; the
mortification, however ill-deserved, was a very substantial grievance." Burton v.
Crowell Pub]. Co., 82 F.2d 154, 155 (2d Cir. 1936).
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form.10 2 Perhaps ridicule differs from other modes of libel in its
clear signal that the matter described is not, and often cannot be,
true.10 3 If libel is a "passing off" of the false as true, then ridicule
does not generally deceive.104 Where it does deceive-in the "false
102 "[Wlhile burlesque is a comparatively modern form of art dating to the
late sixteenth or early seventeenth century, parody has been recognized as a distinct
artistic creation almost from the very beginning of literature, dramatic or other."
Yankvich, Parody and Burlesque in the Law of Copyright, 33 Cx. B. REv. 1130,
1133 (1955). For example,
poetical parody was cultivated by the Romans. Cervantes' Don Quixote
began as a parody on the Spanish novel of chivalry .
In the eighteenth century, Marivaux parodied the Iliad, and the works,
ideas and methods of expression of Corneille, Racine, Voltaire, Rousseau
and Beaumarchais, to name only the great, were parodied mercilessly ....
In English literature all the great poets from Chaucer onward wrote
parodies.
Id. 1134-35.
1o0 Plaintiff, in reality, is suing on account of "hurt feelings" rather than
reputation. After all, the more bizarre and fabulistic the fictional depiction, the
less likely is it that plaintiff would be scorned or his reputation jeopardized. The
traditional rule is, of course, that a publication that "may be unpleasant . . . may
annoy or irk . . . subject him to joke or to jest or to banter . . . even to the
extent of affecting his feelings . . . in itself is not enough" where reputation is
unaffected. Cohen v. New York Times Co., 153 App. Div. 242, 138 N.Y.S. 206,
210 (1912) (false death notice, even if intentionally placed, not actionable). "The
law seeks to compensate for damage to the person, the reputation, or the property
of an individual. It cannot and does not undertake to compensate for mere hurt
or embarrassment alone." Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 788, 195
S.E. 55, 61 (1938) (mistaken placement of plaintiff's photo in advertisement for
vaudeville show; she had consented to use of picture in magazine with sexual over-
tones). Yet, where an outrageous misrepresentation is present, at least one court
has found that "[tihe gravamen of the wrong in defamation is not so much the
injury to reputation, measured by the opinions of others, as the feelings, that is,
the repulsion or the light esteem, which those opinions engender." Burton v.
Crowell Publ. Co., 82 F.2d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 1936).
The breadth of permissible damages for libel recognized by Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), may require re-evaluation of the entire question.
104 "Passing off" under certain circumstances may be libelous. Where an
advertisement used an imitation of the famous voice of a well-known entertainer,
one court found that "a] charge that an entertainer has stooped to perform below
his class may be found to damage his reputation." Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300
F.2d 256, 258 (1st Cir. 1962). Since it is true today (even if it was not in 1962)
that many prominent entertainers do commercials, this particular formulation of the
libel rationale may be less persuasive now. See Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The court also alluded to the inferiority of the
imitation and noted that a "manifestly inferior" one would be actionable. 300 F.2d
at 259. Clearly, this rationale would survive contemporary standards. Since plaintiff
had sued for invasion of privacy (actually invasion of a right to publicity) and
unfair competition (the court found that a passing off was involved for this purpose),
the matter is dictum. It is significant that post-Lahr decisions have emphasized
Lahr's singular quality of voice, that made his situation not just a difference of
degree but a difference in kind, in distinguishing other claims of passing off and
finding them non-actionable. Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711
(9th Cir. 1970) (television commercial using famous singer's voice imitation, in
absence of competition between plaintiff and defendant and without copyright, held
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attribution" cases-courts have moved unerringly to find liability.10 5
Ridicule takes many forms; it may often be in "bad taste," a
judgment that is invariably subjective. Sullivan recognized that, at
least in commenting upon the acts of public officials, "caustic"
speech "not always in good taste" is deserving of constitutional
protection1 06
Ridicule is also unique in that it always involves falsity. To
apply the Sullivan tests-tests premised on the speaker's regard for
the truthfulness of his statement-to ridicule is plainly ludicrous.
For instance, it would ban travesty-"a grotesque or debased imita-
tion or likeness," an art form that puts "high, classic characters into
prosaic situations, with a corresponding stepping down of the
language." 107 Indeed, even the most gentle satire, since it is not
true and is known by the artist not to be true, would be jeopardized.
Although the courts have immunized certain forms of false state-
ments, they have done so in cases of errors either of "ideas" them-
selves (there are, constitutionally speaking, no "false ideas") or of
errors of purported fact. While the Warren Court's tolerance of
factual misstatements in Sullivan may fruitfully be compared to
the Burger Court's disenchantment with them in Gertz, any distinc-
tions are irrelevant to the problems of intentional errors purveyed
by ridicule. 0 8
non-actionable); Davis v. Trans-World Airlines, 297 F. Supp. 1145 (C.D. Calif.
1969).
Dean Leon Green has said that "perhaps the most comprehensive term in which
the libel concept can be expressed is that of misrepresentation of the victim's per-
sonality." GREEN, MALON, P nucK AND RAim, Isjunms To RELATIONS 373
(1959) quoted in Netterville, Copyright and Tort Aspects of Parody, Mimicry, and
Humorous Commentary, 35 S. CAL. L. tEv. 225, 260 n.150 (1962).
1o5 The false attribution cases involve a "passing off" by one person of the
name (or distinctive character) of another in a context that would lead to lowered
public esteem of the person allegedly named. Thus, Lahr and Kerby are clearly
in this realm, see note 104 supra. In the false authorship cases, there must be an
imputation that the work allegedly produced was inferior. Ben-Oliel v. Press Pub].
Co., 251 N.Y. 250 (1929); Gershwin v. Ethical PubL Co., 166 Misc. 39, 1 N.Y.S.2d
904 (N.Y. City Ct. 1937). If the work is not inferior or does not otherwise lead
to lowered public esteem, it may nevertheless be an invasion of privacy. See
Thompson v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 40 Misc. 2d 608, 243 N.Y.S.2d 652 (Sup. Ct.
1963).
106 376 U.S. at 269.
107 D. McDoNALD, PAnoinms 557 (1966).
108 "Even a false statement may be deemed to make a valuable contribution to
public debate, since it brings about 'the clearer perception and livelier impression
of truth produced by its collision with error."' New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964) (quoting J.S. Mill's On Liberty). Whatever the meaning
of this statement, it clearly does not apply to later Court condemnations of "cal-
culated falsehood."
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The law of libel has made only a superficial distinction between
ridicule that "bites" and gentler forms; yet it is apparent that the
literature of faction will require a deeper and more sophisticated
understanding.10 9 The law, in general, has not carefully distin-
guished between satire, parody, burlesque, and travesty. True
parody, for instance, "involves an imitation of the distinct style of
an author, usually turning the style toward an inappropriate or ludi-
crous subject." 110 It mimes the original style and is often "written
out of admiration rather than contempt." "I Since it is a somewhat
exaggerated mimicry, and, in essence, is meaningful only to the
extent that it is accurate, it probably would be fully protected under
the evolving rules of fair comment. Thus, insofar as The Public
Burning mimics Nixon's distinctive style and turns it toward "an
inappropriate or ludicrous subject," the result is parody. The
only real issue concerning parody is whether it can readily be in-
terpreted as such or whether it is being "passed off" as the work
of the parodied author; certainly, no one reading the literature of
faction can possibly believe that Richard Nixon (or anyone else
parodied) wrote or spoke the passages attributed to him.
Much of the literature of faction is travesty-"a grotesque or
debased imitation or likeness," the casting of "characters into pro-
saic situations, with a corresponding stepping down of the lan-
guage." 1x2 It is, historically, a low form of comedy-and, perhaps,
less legally protectible than true parody. In The Public Burning,
Nixon is often depicted in "prosaic situations," including those
involving an attempt to wipe excrement from his shoe and his
discomfort at the prospect of seducing Ethel Rosenberg." 3  Since
these situations involve embarrassment rather than true offensive-
ness, it would seem that even minimal constitutional or fair com-
ment protections should be appropriate.
Burlesque, a more advanced art form than travesty, also
performs an almost directly opposite function. While travesty
trivializes, burlesque ludicrously exaggerates. It "aims at eliciting
109 But see MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 425 F. Supp. 443, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1976):
"[T]he law permits more extensive use of the protectible portion of the copy-
righted work in the creation of a burlesque of that work than in the creation of
other fictional or dramatic works not intended as a burlesque of the original",
quoting Columbia Pictures Corp. v. NBC, 137 F. Supp. 348, 354 (S.D. Cal.
1955). But, "[flor the purposes of this opinion, the fine distinctions between
burlesque and parody are ignored." 425 F. Supp. at 453 n.17.
1o D. McDoNAiD, supra note 107, at 557, 560.
111 Id. xiii.
112 Id. 557.
I1 R. CoovER, supra note 56 at 264, 432.
1978] LIBEL 1095
1096 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
laughter by caricature of the manner or spirit of serious works, or
by ludicrous treatment of their subjects." 114 Indeed, burlesque is
often the subject matter of copyright infringement litigation, .and
has even been specially protected in those situations.115 Burlesque
is linguistically the equivalent of ridicule, and is at once the art form
that carries the greatest "sting" and the one most recognized as
deserving of some constitutional protection.1 6 Much of the real
controversy about the novel of faction revolves about its elements
of burlesque rather than travesty or parody. Indeed, The Public
Burning itself is a form of fabulism or super-burlesque, and a flight
not into the higher atmosphere of burlesque but into a literary
stratosphere. It should be noted that most of the defamation ques-
tions not pertaining to Nixon directly but to the reams of celebrities
named by Coover are connected to this particular event. The event
is purely and unabashedly symbolic and the celebrities' names are
used as pure symbols to depict an almost other-worldly concatena-
tion of forces bearing down on destruction of the Rosenbergs as
exorcism of our national devils. At this point, frenzy substitutes for
humor and .the orgiastic nightmare is capped by the sodomization of
Nixon by an entirely mythical Uncle Sam.
Just as the magnitude of the event-the public execution of
the Rosenbergs-rises beyond the conventions of humor and com-
ment, so the use of names as "symbols" rises beyond the categories
of libel law. While many of the incidental possible libels that
dot the novel can be analyzed in terms of the conventional cate-
gories, the ultimate vision (or is it hallucination?) of the artist can-
not. There is a "sting," but the sting is directed not at the historical
114 D. McDoNALD, supra note 107, at 557-58. See MCA, Inc. v. Wilson,
425 F. Supp. 443, 452 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
115 "The law regarding fair use has been interpreted in various ways depend-
ing on the art form at issue. In burlesque, 'the law permits more extensive use
of the protectible portion of the copyright work in the creation of a burlesque of
that work than in the creation of other fictional or dramatic works not intended as
a burlesque of the original."' MCA, Inc. v. Wilsonj 425 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (quoting from and endorsing Columbia Pictures Corp. v. NBC, 137 F. Supp.
348, 354 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
116 Parody has received substantial protection in the realm of copyright infringe-
ment. "[As a general proposition, we believe that parody and satire are deserving
of substantial freedom-both as entertainment and as a form of social and literary
criticism." Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964)
(emphasis in original). Citing the "historic importance and social value of parody
and burlesque," the court held protected a "Mad Magazine" burlesque of a famous
song writer's lyrics. Even the great interest in copyright protection was subordinated
to "the greater public interest in the development of art, science and industry,"
at least where the parody recalled or conjured up the original without taking too
much of it. Id. 544. See generally notes 39, 109 supra; M. Nmnmr%, CoPyuSGHT
§ 145 (1976).
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actors who participate in the phantasmagoria, but at the basis of
the American national identity. It may well be that the plethora of
names and the sheer density and intensity of the author's depiction
and vision will immunize (or should immunize) his work from
individual libel judgments. Had Coover chosen to limit his range
of vision, had he chosen one celebrity to bear the weight of his
onslaught, had he not painted Richard Nixon as a complex com-
bination of sympathetic and sordid traits but more simply, had he
written "of and concerning" Nixon or Kaufman or Cohn (or, for
that matter, Bob Hope or Red Skelton, or... ), the legal questions
involved would have been more readily resolved. Since the author's
message about our national character-a message that is consti-
tutionally protected-completely transcends its medium (the use
of celebrities' names which are, in themselves, symbols),117 this par-
ticular work of fiction deserves legal immunity from liability. It
must be recognized that this is the kind of "hard case" that often
makes, not bad, but rather, inadequate, law. The next author may
not be as possessed of his demons so as to carefully distinguish be-
tween the persona and the symbolic meaning of the names used;
the next author may not as clearly depict names as vehicles, or
combine pity and sympathy with contempt to create a rounded
"Richard Nixon"; the next author may choose to remain at ground
or atmosphere level, rather than ascend to the realm reached by
Robert Coover. While it may be difficult to predict judicial re-
action to this or future cases dealing with faction, it is clear that
modern literature will increasingly present unprecedented legal
problems. There will be a next author and there will be some
adjudication on the permissible limits to which he can go. Hope-
fully, exploration of these limits will be enhanced by an under-
standing that "vigorous, wide open, and robust" debate can take
the form of creative art as well as scholarly discourse, and that some
breathing space must be allowed to those artistic, literary, and
117 "Is there any basis for any inference on the part of rational readers or
viewers that the antics engaging their attention are anything more than fiction ... ?"
University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 22 App.
Div. 2d 452, 455, 256 N.Y.S.2d 301, 304 (1965), af'd, 15 N.Y.2d 940, 207 N.E.2d
508 (1965). The movie at issue, "John Coldfarb, Please Come Home," bears an
uncanny resemblance to The Public Burning. It was a "broad farce" that contained
no reasonable inference of any connection to the real Notre Dame.
It is always wise to remember a quote from Holmes: "A word is not a crystal,
transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly
in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is
used." Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918). This language was quoted in
a libel case to preclude liability for language which, at one time, would have been
regarded as egregiously defamatory. Fram v. Yellow Cab Co., 380 F. Supp. 1314,
1338 n.14 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
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scholarly forms that press for recognition in our time. This is not
to say that, presented with a libel action, the court's choice should
always be for the artist. Rather, our goal should be to expose the
often subtle ways that mechanical application of the law may ignore
the writer's craft and constrain artistic freedom.118 Only then may
we weigh the interests at stake more precisely and, one hopes, choose
more wisely.
118 What Leon Edel has said of scientists is also true of lawyers and judges:
It may, indeed be difficult for a man trained in science to accept a type of
fiction which contains discontinuity and which scrambles its data; which
... seems to be all clutter and chaos; but this is the way of conscious-
ness, and one would have been even more surprised if the literary sensi-
bility of our time had ignored the attempt of fiction to use symbolist
methods and approach the condition of poetry.
L. EDE,, supra note 5, at 202.
